FRUSTRATED INTENTIONS AND BINDING
BIOLOGY: SEEKING AID IN THE LAW
ANNE REICHMAN SCHIFFt
INTRODUCTION

Lisa, an unmarried woman, is impregnated through the process of artificial insemination by donor (AID) with sperm donated
by Andrew, an acquaintance. Lisa and Andrew agree before the
insemination that Andrew will have no support obligations towards
the child and that he will not seek custody or visitation rights.
However, during the course of Lisa's pregnancy or following the
birth of the child, one of the following two scenarios occurs:
(i) Andrew changes his mind with regard to the original
agreement and brings an action to obtain visitation rights;
or
(ii) Lisa changes her mind with regard to the original
agreement and brings an action seeking support payments
from Andrew.
Should Andrew's biological tie be a sufficient basis for him to
be granted visitation rights over Lisa's strenuous objections?
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Should Andrew's biological connection to the child allow Lisa to
extract support obligations from him against his will? Should the
parties' pre-conception intentions shape the way the law treats
their responsibilities to the child?
The establishment of a legal framework to determine the
assignment of parental rights and responsibilities in the context of
AID1 compels an examination of fundamental issues concerning
parenthood, procreation, and family. Yet the relationship of these
issues to AID has rarely been articulated, let alone explored.
Whatever the reasons for the silence that historically has surrounded AID, it is important that hitherto unchallenged assumptions
about the role of biology and intent be made explicit and be examined. Only then will it be possible to formulate sound law and
policy that anticipate and deal adequately with potential legal
problems.
If the law governing AID is to be responsive to current social
realities, a variety of interests needs to be addressed. These
include the interest of individuals in having their decisions
regarding procreation respected, the interest of the child in being
raised in a committed, nurturing relationship, and the interest of
the state in promoting family units that conform to a social norm
or cultural ideal.
Current law concerning AID largely discounts the pre-conception intentions of the parties.' Instead, it treats the parties as
though they had achieved conception through sexual intercourse,
assigning legal parental status in such a way as to reinforce the
traditional nuclear family model. In so doing the law disregards
the fact that AID is used not only by married couples for medical
reasons,3 but also by individuals and couples who intend to create

1.

Artificial insemination (AI) is a technique involving the insertion of semen into a

woman's cervical canal or directly into her uterus by means other than sexual intercourse.
When the source of the semen is the woman's husband, the procedure is referred to as
artificial insemination by husband (AIH). When the source of the semen is a man other
than the woman's husband, the procedure is called artificial insemination by donor
(AID). Al is an extremely "low-tech" procedure, usually requiring only a syringe or even
a utensil as basic as a turkey-baster. Daniel Wikler & Norma J. Wikler, Turkey-Baster
Babies: The Demedicalization of Artificial Insemination, 69 MILBANK Q. 5, 8 (1991).

2. See infra subsection I(B)(2).
3. Medical reasons motivating the use of AID include lack of sperm production, Rh
incompatibility, the risk of passing on a known genetic disorder or sexually transmitted
disease, and the risk resulting from exposure to mutagens. See generally U.S. CONGRESS,
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
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familial arrangements that do not necessarily conform to this model. Indeed, it is precisely because AID separates reproduction from
sexuality that it affords single women and lesbian couples the
opportunity to form "non-traditional" family units, without the
need for sexual involvement. AID, therefore, has far-reaching
societal consequences, for it greatly augments the range of available personal and social options in procreation.4 Yet the law has
not kept pace with the new advances in this field, and it continues
to impose a social norm that is often at variance with the desires
and intentions of the parties involved.
AID and other new reproductive practices5 have a profound
impact on our understanding of the concept of "parenthood."
Parenthood can now be fragmented into distinct components of a
social, genetic, or, in the case of surrogate motherhood, gestational
nature, resulting in a possible multiplicity of "reproductive collaborators," as they are sometimes termed.6 One of the unforeseen
outcomes of new reproductive practices is that the conventional
terminology for describing these multiple "collaborators" and their
respective legal roles has been rendered inadequate. With respect
to procreation by sexual intercourse, the law has designated a
maximum of two persons-one of each sex-as having "legal parental status."7 Even in this context, the usefulness of such a portrayal may be limited, given the large percentage of families that
do not conform to the nuclear family model;' in the context of
61-82 (1988) (discussing factors contributing to infertility) [hereinafter OTA INFERTILITY
REPORT].

4. See Barbara Kritchevsky, The Unmarried Woman's Right to Artificial Insemination:
A Call for an Expanded Definition of Family, 4 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1981) (arguing
that AID should be widely available to unmarried women); Note, Reproductive Technology and the Procreation Rights of the Unmarried, 98 HARV. L. REV. 669 (1985) (arguing

that legislatures and courts cannot constitutionally limit access to AID).
5.

Other new reproductive practices include in vitro fertilization, embryo transfer,

gamete intrafallopian transfer, embryo freezing, surrogate motherhood, and egg donation.
See OTA INFERTILITY REPORT, supra note 3, at 239-308.

6. The term "collaborative reproduction" is used by some writers to refer to the
provision of gametes or gestation in a reproductive arrangement. See, e.g., JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 119 (1994).

7. The term "legal parental status" refers to a bundle of rights and obligations, of
which the most significant relate to custody, visitation, support, and inheritance. Other
rights and duties include the areas of education, religious upbringing, discipline, and medical treatment. Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The

Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA.
L. REV. 879, 884-85 (1984).
8. Courts traditionally have adopted a formal approach to defining "family," recog-
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new reproductive practices, it is far too restrictive and insufficiently descriptive.9
The main thesis of this Article is that, in contrast to procreation by sexual intercourse, artificial insemination requires a legal
response predicated on enforcing the pre-conception intentions of
the parties."0 Whereas reproduction may or may not be the intended aim of sexual intercourse, a pregnancy achieved through
artificial insemination is unambiguously intentional, purposeful, and
deliberate. Parties contemplating reproduction through AID are in
a position to negotiate, prior to conception, the allocation of parental rights and obligations, and they usually enter the AID arrangement in reliance on such an agreement. It is in the interests
of both parties, as well as the resulting child, that these relied-on
expectations be respected by the courts in the event of a later
dispute.
This Article examines the current allocation of parental rights
and responsibilities in AID and proposes an alternative model that
emphasizes the pre-conception intentions of the parties. Part I
describes current statutes and caselaw governing parental status in
the context of procreation both through sexual intercourse and by
means of AID, and highlights the problems that exist when parental rights conflicts arise between unmarried women and known
donors. Part II discusses the reasons why the approach offered by
current family law principles is inappropriate in the context of new

nizing only those relationships based on biology, adoption, or marriage. However, some
commentators have urged that a functional approach to family be applied, by inquiring as
to whether "a relationship shares the essential characteristics of a traditionally accepted

relationship and fulfills the same human needs." Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional Approach to the Legal Definition of Family, 104
HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1646 (1991); see also Bartlett, supra note 7, at 882.

9. To minimize confusion, the phrases "legal parental status" and "legal parenthood"
(and variations such as "legal parent" and "legal father") are used in this Article to describe the legal status occupied either by the custodial parent or by a noncustodial parent
who has agreed prior to conception to have significant ongoing involvement with and

responsibility for a child. Thus, for present purposes-and contrary to current law-a
sperm donor who has agreed to minimal or no rights or obligations with respect to a
child would not be eligible to be described as a "legal parent," even though he is a biological parent.
Consideration might be given to expanding the terminology used in this context
and applying a more functional definition. For example, the parental roles could be designated as "primary" and "secondary," depending on the functions performed by the
persons occupying those roles.
10. See infra Part II.
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reproductive practices. It proposes an intent-based system in which
pre-conception intentions would be enforced, thereby ensuring the
predictability of legal outcome and minimizing the potential for
conflicts between the adult parties. As the existence and content
of the original agreement must be clearly evidenced so that preconception intentions can be enforced, this Article proposes a
registration scheme whereby parties who wish to be assured of a
predictable legal outcome may register their agreement with the
state before the insemination takes place. Part III argues that even
under an intent-based system, the significance of biology should be
acknowledged as having potentially profound societal and personal
implications. Consequently, it maintains that, as law and public
policy with respect to AID develop, some fundamental assumptions concerning the desirability of anonymity need to be reexamined as law and public policy with respect to AID develop.
I. THE DETERMINATION OF LEGAL PARENTHOOD:
CURRENT LAW

In determining legal parental status, the question of the relative weight to be accorded biology and intent as separate components of parenthood needs to be considered. Specifically, how
much significance does biology carry under present law when the
biological act of procreation is unaccompanied by an intent to
raise the child?
A. Legal ParentalStatus and Procreation Through Sexual
Intercourse
In a number of areas of law, such as contract, tort, and criminal law, the mental state of an individual is critical in determining
legal consequences." Under current family law principles, however, intent is relatively unimportant in the determination of legal
parental status. Biology is accorded far more weight than intent,
the amount of weight depending largely on the social policy goal
being promoted.

11. In criminal law, a "guilty mind" (mens rea), as well as a "guilty act" (actus reus),
is required for most crimes. In contract law, there must be a "meeting of the minds"
(consensus ad idem) before courts recognize and enforce a contractual obligation. With
the exception of strict liability, torts are defined and categorized according to the mental
state of the defendant: intention, recklessness, or negligence.
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The law traditionally has placed a high value on the biological
component of parenthood," reflecting in part the significance that
biological connection represents to many people. Indeed, the pain
of infertility is itself testimony to the importance placed on the
presence of a genetic link.13 So, too, one of the reasons why AID
is frequently viewed as a more attractive option than adoption is
that with AID one of the rearing parents will be genetically related to the resulting child. For some individuals and couples, the
wish to pass on genes to future generations is a profound yearning
that gives meaning to parenthood. For other couples, the desire to
have a child "of one's own" has to do not only with the transmission of genes but also with deep longings to fuse their two

genetic heritages and thereby create a "new branch of their joined
family tree." 4

In the case of fatherhood, however, biology, while traditionally the primary determinant of legal paternal status, has not been

the only means of establishing paternity. Unlike biological motherhood, which was an objectively ascertainable fact,15 biological fatherhood was, until the development of scientific tests to deter-

12. See Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 1519, 1527 (1990) (commenting that "[j]udges have repeatedly responded to parental
disputes by choosing solutions that implicitly favor biological over social relationships,"
and that "legislatures have created incentives skewed toward biological parenthood and
against adoption"); Andrea E. Stumpf, Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Reproductive Technologies, 96 YALE LJ. 187, 195 n.29 (1986).
13. It might be claimed, however, that for some the pain of infertility has less to do
with not having a biological child than with not having a child to raise, regardless of the
presence or absence of a biological connection. For a poignant description of one
person's struggle with the personal, medical, and social aspects of infertility, see N.J.
COMM'N ON LEGAL & ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE DELIVERY OF HEALTH CARE, AF-

TER BABY M: THE LEGAL, ETHICAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF SURROGACY 13

(1992) [hereinafter NJ. COMM'N REPORT].
14. LEON R. KASS, TOWARD A MORE NATURAL SCIENCE 111 (1985). Kass states,
[F]or most of us, it would not be a matter of indifference if the sperm used to
fertilize the egg were provided by an identical twin brother.... Rather, the
humanly crucial sense of one's own, the sense that leads most people to choose
their own, rather than to adopt, is captured by such phrases as "my seed,"
"flesh of my flesh," "sprung from my loins." More accurately, since one's own
is not the own of one but of two, the desire to have a child of one's own is a
couple's desire to embody, out of the conjugal union of their separate bodies, a
child who is flesh of their separate flesh made one.
Id. at 110.
15. The ability of new reproductive practices to separate the genetic and gestational
components of motherhood by means of egg donation and surrogate motherhood means
that the biological "fact" of motherhood is no longer self-evident. See Johnson v. Calvert,
851 P.2d 776, 780-81 (Cal.), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 206 (1993).
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16
mine paternity, "a matter of inference rather than certainty."'
For this reason, the common law established that a claim to fatherhood also exists if the male and the mother of the child are
married to each other. 7 Thus, the common law presumption of
legitimacy in marriage, whereby any child born to a married couple is irrebuttably presumed to be the legitimate child of the marriage regardless of biological evidence to the contrary," serves to
resolve the problem of paternal uncertainty by replacing the requirement of a biological tie to the child with the requirement of
a marital tie to the child's mother.
Historically, the purposes of the irrebuttable presumption of
legitimacy were to protect public expenditure by preventing the
child from becoming dependent on state benefits, to promote the
societal norm of a traditional family unit, and to shield the child
from the social and economic hardships resulting from illegitimacy. 9 Today, though the social stigma of illegitimacy is considerably diminished, the law still favors legitimating the child, even
when there is biological evidence to the contrary."

16. Marjorie M. Schultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An
Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 297, 316.
17. See In re Findlay, 170 N.E. 471, 473 (N.Y. 1930). Yet a third basis for a claim
to fatherhood is adoption, following the termination of the biological parents' parental
rights. However, while adoption is an important means for acquiring parental status, it is
a statutory creation that was completely unknown at common law.
18. "If a husband, not physically incapable, was within the four seas of England
during the period of gestation, the court would not listen to evidence casting doubt on
his paternity." Id. at 472. Moreover, under what became enshrined as Lord Mansfield's
Rule, neither husband nor wife was allowed to give evidence of lack of sexual intercourse. The origins of this principle are found in the case of Goodright v. Moss, 98 Eng.
Rep. 1257, 1258 (K.B. 1777), in which Lord Mansfield stated, "But it is a rule, founded
in decency, morality, and policy, that [the spouses] shall not be permitted to say after
marriage, that they have had no connection, and therefore that the offspring is spurious."
19. See generally Carol Smart, "There is of course the distinction dictated by nature":
Law and the Problem of Paternity, in REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 98-117 (Michelle
Stanworth ed., 1987) (tracing the law's attachment of men to children).
20. Under statutory law, the presumption of legitimacy is irrebuttable in some states.
Even in many states where the presumption is rebuttable, only the husband or wife-not
the putative father alone-may challenge the presumption. For example, in Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), the U.S. Supreme Court held, based on the relevant
California statutory provision, that the presumption of legitimacy could be rebutted only
by the husband or wife, and then only in very limited circumstances. Although blood
tests established a 98.07% probability that the putative father was the biological father of
the child, the Court held that the presumption of legitimacy applied and that it did not
infringe on the due process rights of the putative father. Id. at 114, 124-25.
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When the biological parents of a child are unmarried, there is
no legal presumption to rely on and, therefore, the biological pa-

ternal tie is accorded greater significance by the law. However,
even though the biological connection is a sufficient condition for
the imposition of legal obligations-especially support obligations-on the father, it is not in and of itself a basis for according

the unwed father legal rights with respect to the child. To achieve
this, the unwed father needs to demonstrate not only a biological
link but also a commitment to establishing a social relationship
with the child. 2' The U.S. Supreme Court in Lehr v. Robertson'
observed that there is a "clear distinction between a mere biological relationship and an actual relationship of parental responsibility,"' and stated,
The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the
natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to
develop a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's
future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship
and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child's development.24

Therefore, it is only if the unmarried biological father "grasps that
opportunity" that he and the mother are regarded as being on an

21. The constitutional rights of an unwed biological father have been considered by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (involving due process and equal protection claim regarding unwed father's right to have notice of adoption
hearings and right to be heard prior to adoption of child by mother's husband); Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (challenging as a violation of equal protection a New
York statute that allowed an unwed mother, but not an unwed father, to veto an adoption by withholding consent); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (involving due
process and equal protection claims by unwed biological father seeking to block adoption
of child by mother's husband); and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (challenging
an Illinois statute that conclusively presumed every unwed father to be unfit to care for
his children).
22. 463 U.S. at 248.
23. Id. at 259-60.
24. Id. at 262.
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equal footing vis-d-vis the child.' Otherwise, while he has support
obligations, he is not able to seek custody or visitation rights.26
Thus, the common law presumption of legitimacy and the law
with respect to unwed fathers' rights demonstrate that the existence of a biological relationship is not necessarily conclusive in
determining parental rights. In the case of the marital presumption
of legitimacy, the absence of a biological connection does not
deprive the husband of such rights and, in the case of the unwed
father, its presence does not automatically guarantee them. Rather,
the weight that the law accords to biology is influenced heavily by
favored social policies, such as the desirability of the nuclear family and the importance to the child of having nurturing, committed
parents.
The current exceptions to biology as the determinant of legal
parental status do not include contractual agreements between the
parties whereby they negotiate their legal rights and obligations.

25. It is unclear whether the law requires a proven track record of a committed relationship with the child or whether a stated desire to establish such a relationship is sufficient. In each of the cases considered to date by the U.S. Supreme Court as to the unwed father's constitutional rights, see supra note 21, an opportunity existed over a period
of time for the father to develop a parental relationship with the child. See, e.g., Stanley,
405 U.S. at 646. However, in AID cases there is often no such opportunity, because the
dispute between the unwed parents arises when the child is a newborn or shortly
thereafter. The question of the unmarried father's constitutional rights at the time of the
birth of his child has never been addressed directly by the Supreme Court. MARTHA A.
FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 121-25 (1990).
26. Depending on the court's assessment as to whether maintaining contact with the
biological father is in the child's interests, the court may award visitation rights. Should
the biological father seek custody, the court would apply the "best interests of the child"
test, a comparative standard that attempts to judge the respective parenting abilities of
the biological parents. This test, however, while somewhat problematic in general, is particularly so in the AID context because in most cases the child is a newborn at the time
of litigation. Therefore, there is no parenting history-or at least, not with respect to the
particular child-upon which comparative assessments can be made. An analysis of some
of the problems posed by the best interests standard in custody disputes following the
dissolution of marriage is found in Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, at
226, 236. For a discussion of the applicability of the best interests test in the context of
a different new reproductive practice, surrogate motherhood, see N.J. COMM'N REPORT,
supra note 13, at 144-53.
27. E.g., Estes v. Albers, 504 N.W.2d 607 (S.D. 1993). In this case, Albers consented
to father a child for Estes after the two agreed that Albers would have no financial responsibility for the child. The child was conceived through sexual intercourse, and Albers
acknowledged his paternity. Id. at 608. Later he agreed to support the child, and Estes
sued for increased support. Id. The Supreme Court of South Dakota rejected Albers's
argument that his status was nothing more than that of a semen donor and that he
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The state in its role as parens patriae has an interest in protecting
children by designating those who are responsible for children's
care and custody. In general, those so designated by the law are
the biological parents. When the biological parents are unwilling or
unable to care for the child, or when it becomes apparent that the
child requires protection from the biological parents, the state intervenes by providing for the termination of parental rights and
the transfer of custody and control of the child by means of adoption or placement in a foster home. The legal rules relating to
adoption and the termination of parental rights, as well as the
prohibition against "baby selling," ensure that the acquisition or
transfer of parental rights does not take place by contractual
agreements between private parties. The state thereby seeks to
promote the child's interest in stability and security by clearly
identifying from the outset those responsible for the welfare of the
child, without the risk of disputes regarding the interpretation of

contractual terms.2
B. Legal ParentalStatus and AID

Despite the fact that AID is the oldest of the "new" reproductive techniques,29 there is comparatively little statutory law or

should thus be afforded the protection given by the law to anonymous donors. The court
held that since the agreement was not supported by adequate consideration and was not
court-approved, as required by the state statute, it was void. Id. at 609. The court noted
that "[t]his result is consistent with the public policy that parental agreements which have
the effect of making a child a public charge cannot be countenanced and a support
agreement injurious to the best interest of the child is invalid for any purpose." Id.
28. A.M. Capron & MJ. Radin, Choosing Family Law over Contract Law as a Paradigm for Surrogate Motherhood, 16 LAv, MED. & HEALTH CARE 34, 35 (1988).

29. The first reported case of AID in the United States was an infamous one. It
took place in 1884, at Jefferson Medical College in Philadelphia, where Dr. William
Pancoast inseminated his patient, a married woman, with the semen of one of his medical students by means of a syringe. The woman, who had been anesthetized with chloroform during the procedure, had no knowledge that she was being inseminated with donor
sperm. She was never informed of this fact, even after the birth of her son nine months
later. GENA COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE 12 (1985).

Later interest in AID was generated largely as a result of the enthusiasm and pioneering work of Dr. Robert L. Dickinson, who began performing the procedure in the
1890s. The practice began to gain momentum in the medical profession in the 1920s and
1930s. WILFRED J. FINEGOLD, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 7 (2d ed. 1976).
While the silence and stigma that historically have surrounded AID and the subject
of male infertility preclude reliable estimates of the total number of children born
through AID, a survey conducted by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) estimated that in 1986-1987, 172,000 women underwent artificial insemination, resulting in a
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caselaw on the subject. Present law concerning AID tends to be
piecemeal, failing to provide a coherent response to the complexities and challenges presented by this not-so-"new" reproductive
practice.3
1. Current Statutory Law. Existing AID legislation varies

from state to state. Fifteen states have no statute addressing parental rights and responsibilities with respect to AID. Of the thirty-five states that have legislated on this matter,31 thirteen modeled their statutes on the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), 3' an
advisory statute developed in 1973 by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Each state can choose
either to accept the UPA model as is, to adopt a variant of it, to
enact legislation based on a different model, or to make no
statutory pronouncement at all. Where no state statute exists, or
where the circumstances of a case fall outside the criteria estabtotal of 65,000 births. Of these, 35,000 births were the result of artificial insemination by
husband (AIH), and 30,000 resulted from AID. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION: PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES: SUMMA-

RY OF A 1987 SURVEY: BACKGROUND PAPER 3 (1988) [hereinafter ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION REPORT].

30. One writer describes the current environment within which AID operates as follows: "The present system is characterized by the absence of legal control, no comprehensive code of practice, no systematic counseling, problems of illegality, concealment,
deception, secrecy, as well as tacit official and medical acceptance." ELIZABETH NOBLE,
HAVING YOUR BABY BY DONOR INSEMINATION 240-41 (1987).
31. See ALA. CODE § 26-17-21 (1992); ALASKA STAT. § 25-20-045 (1991);
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (Michie
CAL. CIv. CODE § 7005 (West 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-106 (Supp. 1993);
GEN. STAT. §§ 45a-771 to -775 (1992); FL.X. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp.
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-21, 43-34-42 (1991); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-5401 to -5408

ARIZ.
1993);
CONN.
1994);
(1993);

ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 750, para. 40/3 (Smith-Hurd 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128 to

-130 (1988); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West 1993); MD. CODE ANN., EST. &
TRUSTS § 1-206(b) (1991); MASS ANN. LAWS ch. 46, § 4B (Law. Co-op. 1993); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 333.2824(6) (1992); MINN. STAT. § 257.56 (1993); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 210.824 (Vernon Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 126.061 (Michie 1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:3(e) (1994); N.J. STAT.
§ 9:17-44 (1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (Michie 1994); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73
(McKinney 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-03
(1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.30-.38 (Baldwin 1992); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10,

§§ 551-553 (1994); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.239, .243 (1990); id. §§ 677.355, .360, .365,
.370 (1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-306 (1992); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.03 (West
1986 & Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156 to -165 (Michie 1994); WASH. REV.
CODE § 26.26.050 (1994); WIS. STAT. § 891.40 (1993); WYO. STAT. § 14-2-103 (1994).
32. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT,9B U.L.A. 287 (1987). The 13 states that have modeled
their legislation on the UPA are Alabama, California, Colorado, Illinois, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
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lished by statute, any dispute concerning parental rights and responsibilities in an AID case is governed by traditional family law
principles.
The purpose of the UPA is to ensure that children born out
of wedlock are not disadvantaged by the status and stigma of

illegitimacy." Under section 5 of the UPA, 4 the only provision
dealing with AID, the establishment of a legal relationship between the child born through AID and the husband of the woman
undergoing AID is based on the fulfillment of three conditions:
that the woman undergoing AID be married, that her husband
consent to the AID procedure, and that the AID procedure be
carried out under the supervision of a licensed physician. The
UPA thus employs an "inducement" model, whereby the law attempts to channel social behavior by providing the inducement of
a predictable legal outcome.35 If the conditions specified in the
UPA are met, the woman's husband is "treated in law as if he

were the natural father" of the child.36 A legal paternal relationship is thus created despite the fact that there is no biological
relationship between the woman's husband and the child, and
despite the fact that there has been no legal adoption of the child
by the woman's husband. Section 5 further provides that where
33. The Prefatory Note to the UPA states that the purpose of the Act is to provide
"substantive legal equality [for] all children regardless of the marital status of their parents." Id. at 288 Prefatory Note. Thus, the UPA focuses on the establishment of a parent-child relationship and explicitly states that this relationship is not dependent on
whether the child's parents are married.
34. Section 5 provides:
(a) If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of
her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man
not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father
of a child thereby conceived. The husband's consent must be in writing and
signed by him and his wife. The physician shall certify their signatures and the
date of the insemination, and file the husband's consent with the [State Department of Health], where it shall be kept confidential and in a sealed file. However, the physician's failure to do so does not affect the father and child relationship. All papers and records pertaining to the insemination, whether part of
the permanent record of a court or of a file held by the supervising physician
or elsewhere, are subject to inspection only upon the order of the court for
good cause shown.
(b) The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial
insemination of a married woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law
as if- he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.
Id. at 301.
35. For a description of the inducement model and other models of state policy, see
OTA INFERTILITY REPORT, supra note 3, at 285-88.
36. UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT § 5(a), 9B U.L.A. at 301.
37. The same result was reached in a number of cases that arose prior to the enact-
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a legal relationship between the woman's husband and the child
has been created by this section, all legal ties between the donor
and the child are severed.3" Despite his biological connection to
the child, the donor is "treated in law as if he were not the natural father" of the child.39 Some UPA-based statutes sever the legal relationship between the donor and the child not only when
the woman is married, but also when she is single.4 In these jurisdictions, a child born through AID has no legal father.
There are currently twenty-two state statutes dealing with
AID that are not modeled on the UPA. 41 Like the UPA, these
statutes share the aim of declaring legitimate a child born of AID
to a husband and wife when the husband has given his consent.42
A range of approaches is evident among these statutes concerning
a number of issues, such as the marital status of the woman undergoing AID,43 the involvement of physicians in the AID procement of any AID legislation. In People v. Sorensen, 437 P.2d 495 (Cal. 1968), the Supreme Court of California held that a husband who consented to his wife being artificially inseminated with donor sperm had a legal obligation to support the child, since "it
is safe to assume that without defendant's active participation and consent the child
would not have been procreated." Id. at 499. Although the court's holding was limited to
the issue of the husband's criminal liability for nonsupport, the court stated that the
public policy of California favors legitimation and that "no valid public purpose is served
by stigmatizing an artificially conceived child as illegitimate." Id. at 501. The question of
legitimacy was considered also in the New York case of In re Adoption of Anonymous,
345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sur. Ct. 1973), in which the court concluded that "a child born of
consensual AID during a valid marriage is a legitimate child entitled to the rights and
privileges of a naturally conceived child of the same marriage." Id. at 435-36. Cf. Gursky
v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (holding that "a child conceived by
means of artificial insemination of the wife through the use, with the husband's consent,
of semen contributed by a donor other than the husband was not the legitimate issue of
the husband, but that the husband was liable for support of the child").
38. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(b), 9B U.L.A. at 301.
39. Id.
40. In California, Colorado, Illinois, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Washington,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming, the word "married" is omitted in the statutory equivalents to
§ 5(b) of the UPA.
41. The states with such statutes are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire,
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, Texas,
and Virginia.
42. In most of these statutes, the child is "deemed" or "presumed" to be, or "considered" or "treated" as, the natural, legitimate child of the husband and wife. The
Florida and Georgia statutes create an irrebuttable presumption of legitimacy. See FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 (1991). Arizona
takes a more restrictive approach than the other states, providing only for "duties of
support" rather than for legitimation. See ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451(B) (1994).
43. The use of AID by unmarried women is neither expressly precluded nor ap-
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dure,44 and whether the donor's legal relationship to the child is
severed.'

The existing statutes, both UPA-based and non-UPA-based,
suffer from underinclusiveness. As the range of situations covered
is extremely narrow, current legislation fails to resolve comprehensively the many complexities involved in assigning parental status
in AID cases." If the procedure is performed without the superproved by the majority of the statutes. However, in Connecticut, Kansas, and Oklahoma,
the legislation clearly limits AID to married women. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-771
(1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-128 (1988); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 551 (1994). By contrast, in New Hampshire and Ohio, the use of AID by unmarried women is explicitly
contemplated. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:3(e) (1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3111.31 (Baldwin 1992).
44. Performance or supervision of the AID procedure by a physician is required in
Alaska and New York, if the child is to be considered the legitimate child of the husband and wife. ALASKA STAT. § 25-20-045 (1991); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73
(McKinney 1988). In slightly less than half of the statutes there is no mention of physician involvement in the section conferring legitimacy; see, for example, the statutes of
Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, and Texas. However, in a
number of states, artificial insemination may be carried out only by persons licensed to
practice medicine or persons who are under the supervision and control of a physician.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (Michie 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-771 (1992); GA.
CODE ANN. § 43-34-42 (1991); IDAHO CODE § 39-5402 (1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3111.32 (Baldwin 1992); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 551 (1994). In Georgia, the performance
of AID by anyone not authorized to practice medicine is a felony punishable by imprisonment for a term of one to five years, GA. CODE ANN. § 43-34-42, and in Idaho it is
a misdemeanor, IDAHO CODE § 39-5407. Where the statute does not explicitly require
physician involvement in the section conferring legitimacy but provides elsewhere that
AID may be performed only by a physician, a question arises as to the legitimacy of a
child born to a married couple when the AID procedure was not performed by a physician. See McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239, 243 (Or. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that under
the relevant state legislation, the legitimacy of the child was not affected by the fact that
AID had been performed without a physician), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 905 (1990).
45. Only six non-UPA-based statutes-those in Connecticut, Idaho, Ohio, Oregon,
Texas, and Virginia-contain a provision severing the donor's legal relationship to the
child. CONN. GEN STAT. § 45a-771 (1992); IDAHO CODE § 39-5405 (1993); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3111.37 (Baldwin 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.239 (1990); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 12.03 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (Michie 1994).
The remainder of the statutes are silent as to the donor's legal status. New Hampshire's
legislation provides that when an unmarried woman is inseminated with the semen of an
unmarried donor, they may agree in writing in advance of the procedure that the donor
will be the legal father. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:3(e) (1994).
46. The skeletal nature of the UPA provision dealing with Al is acknowledged in
the comment to § 5. The comment states that the "Act does not deal with many complex and serious legal problems raised by the practice of artificial insemination" and
notes that "[flurther consideration of other legal aspects of artificial insemination has
been urged on the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and is
recommended to state legislators." UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 5 cmt., 9B U.L.A. at 302
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vision of a physician,47 or if the woman's husband has not consented to the procedure, or-in most states-if the woman is unmarried," AID participants do not receive the protection offered
by the UPA-based statutes. Similarly, no legislative guidance is offered concerning the legal outcome in a situation falling outside
that described in the non-UPA-based statutes. Given that in the
absence of any statutory protection, traditional family law principles are applied, the legal outcome as to the assignment of parental status may contradict and frustrate the original intentions of
the AID participants. As the following section indicates, existing
law-or lack thereof-renders particularly unsatisfactory the resolution of problems concerning legal parental status in situations
involving an unmarried woman and a known donor.
2. Unmarried Women and Known Donors: The Legal Relevance of Pre-Conception Intentions. While the original impetus for
artificial insemination (AI) was a desire on the part of the medical
profession to help couples who for medical reasons were unable to
conceive, AID is also an option for women who desire to reproduce but do not wish to have any sexual involvement with, or a
long-term commitment to, a male partner.4 9 Although an increasing number of unmarried women are choosing to create families
by means of AID, present statutory law largely ignores this reality.
While a few statutes have replaced the phrase "married woman"
with the word "woman" in their equivalents of section 5(b) of the
UPA,-' the majority of statutes are silent as to the legal status of
the donor in the case of an unmarried woman undergoing AID.
Therefore, where the AID legislation does not either implicitly or
expressly contemplate AID for unmarried women, or where the
factual situation falls outside the conditions described in the legis-

(1987). The non-UPA-based statutes are generally even more skeletal than their UPAbased counterparts.
47. See infra subsection I(B)(3).
48. See infra subsection I(B)(2).
49. According to the survey conducted by the Office of Technology Assessment in
1986-1987, there were approximately 4,000 requests for AID from single women and
1,000 requests from lesbian couples during a 12-month period. ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
REPORT, supra note 29, at 23.
The societal implications of women choosing to have children without marriage are
discussed in Carol A. Donovan, The Uniform ParentageAct and Nonmarital Motherhoodby-Choice, 11 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 193 (1982-1983).

50. See supra note 40.
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lation, or where no AID legislation governing parental status exists, the legal paternity of the child is governed by the same family
law principles that apply when conception has been achieved by
sexual intercourse. Since the application of these principles may
lead to a different legal outcome regarding the status of the donor
than that intended by the parties,51 especially when an unmarried
woman and a known donor are involved, present law operates as a
significant obstacle in the path of women desiring to use AID with
the intent of raising a child in a nontraditional family structure.52
The tendency of present AID law to disregard pre-conception
intentions when these intentions conflict with the conventional
family paradigm is most likely a reflection of society's deep uncertainty as to how the law ought to respond to the deliberate creation of nontraditional family forms through AID, and how it
should attempt to balance the respective interests at stake. As a
result of the law's apparent ambivalence concerning the social
desirability of AID and the law's general tendency to lag behind
medical and scientific advances, the issue of legal parental status in
AID cases has received minimal legislative attention.
The few reported cases concerning disputes between semen
donors and unmarried women demonstrate that courts have not
always accorded a great deal of significance to upholding the
parties' pre-conception intentions and expectations in determining
legal parental status.53 Rather, the law treats the unmarried woman and the donor as it would any two biological parents who have
conceived a child by natural means out of wedlock. For example,
in C.M. v. C.C., decided prior to the enactment of the New Jersey
51. See infra notes 53-70 and accompanying text.
52. The "traditional" family unit may be described as a married woman and man
raising their child or children. Of course, today, divergences from this model are very
common, for reasons having nothing to do with AID. High rates of divorce, subsequent
remarriages, and out-of-wedlock births mean that many children are being raised in
households headed by single women or by stepparents or other adults not biologically
related to them. LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT. SPOUSES, LOVERS,
AND THE LAW 145 (1981). Whether these nontraditional relationships are viewed legally

as "family" relationships has important consequences for adoption, custody, and visitation
rights, as well as other areas such as housing, immigration, social security benefits, and

private insurance benefits. Some have advocated that the law adopt a functional approach
to defining parental status, which would give legal recognition to a broader range of
parenting relationships. See supra note 8.
53. See, e.g., Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986); Ex rel.
R.C., 775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989) (en banc); C.M. v. C.C., 377 A.2d 821 (NJ. Super. 1977);
McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239 (Or. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 905 (1990).
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statute governing AID, the New Jersey Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court held that the semen donor, C.M., was the legal
father of a child conceived by AID and had visitation rights and
support obligations. 4 Conflicting evidence was presented as to the
parties' understanding of the role that C.M. was to undertake in
the child's life. The unmarried woman, C.C., testified that her understanding was that C.M. would be merely a sperm donor and
that he would not act as the child's father. C.M., however, stated
that he and C.C. had been dating for several months and were
contemplating marriage, and that C.M. wished to have a child with
C.C. but that C.C. objected to sexual intercourse before marriage.5 The court's decision to declare C.M. the child's legal father was based not on an acceptance of C.M.'s version of the facts
in preference to C.C.'s, but rather on the court's endorsement of
"a policy favoring the requirement that a child be provided with a
father as well as a mother."56 The court held that "C.M.'s consent
and active participation in the procedure leading to conception
should place upon him the responsibilities of fatherhood."57 As
there was no husband present to assume the role of father, and
since the donor in this case was known to the woman, the court
held that it was in the child's best interests for C.M. to be declared the legal father.
Essentially, the court in C.M. v. C.C. viewed the case as
though the child had been conceived out of wedlock by sexual
intercourse. It stated, "If the conception took place by intercourse,
there would be no question that the 'donor' would be the father.
The issue becomes whether a man is any less a father because he
provides the semen by a method different from that normally
58
used.
The court's holding that C.M. was the legal father is clear
evidence of the aforementioned policy that seeks to promote the
nuclear family. 9 Yet the reason most unmarried women choose
to undergo AID is precisely that they do not desire an ongoing

54. C.M., 377 A.2d at 825. In a subsequent action, C.M. was given the right to have
his name listed on the child's birth certificate as the legal father. C.M. v. C.C., 407 A.2d
849, 852 (NJ. Super. 1979).

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

C.M., 377 A.2d at 821.
Id. at 824-25.
Id. at 825.
Id. at 824.
See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
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relationship with the biological father of the child. In awarding
visitation rights to the donor, the court in C.M. v. C.C. stated, "It
is in a child's best interests to have two parents whenever possible."' Had there been a husband involved who had consented to
his wife's artificial insemination, the court would most likely have
viewed the husband as the legal father.61 However, as the mother
was an unmarried woman, the court turned to the known donor
because "[t]here was no one else who was in a position to take
upon himself the responsibilities of fatherhood when the child was
' The court was far more concerned with providing
conceived."62
the child with two parents, one of each sex, than with determining
and upholding the parties' pre-conception intent. Yet, there seems
to be little justification for the assumption that it is indeed "in the
best interests of the child" to have a biological parent of each sex
when those parties may be hostile strangers to each other.'
Thus, in the case of an unmarried woman and a known donor
who fall outside the protection of a state's AID statute, present
law ignores pre-conception intentions and instead treats as paramount the donor's biological connection to the child. Primacy is
accorded to biology rather than to intentionality when to do otherwise would challenge conventional societal and legal norms,
namely, the nuclear family paradigm.
Legal complexities may also result under present law when an
agreement exists between the donor and the unmarried woman
that the donor will have legal parental status. While some statutes
explicitly provide that such agreements, if in writing, should be upheld,6' many statutes are silent as to these agreements. If a statute severs the legal relationship between the child and the donor
when an unmarried woman is inseminated, and does not provide

60. C.M., 377 A.2d at 825.
61. The court in In re Adoption of Anonymous, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430, 435-36 (Sur. Ct.
1973), did so.
62. C.M., 377 A.2d at 824.
63. See infra Section 11(D).
64. Of the states that statutorily sever the legal tie between the donor and the child,
only New Jersey, New Mexico, and Washington provide for an agreement between the
donor and the woman to the contrary. N.J. STAT. § 9:17-44 (1993); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-11-6 (Michie 1994); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.050 (1994). New Hampshire's statute
achieves a similar result by providing that an unmarried donor is presumed to be the
father of the child if he and the unmarried woman agree to this in writing in advance of
the procedure. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:3(e) (1994); see supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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for any agreement to the contrary, what legal effect-if
any-would an agreement have? Put differently, should a person
whose legal rights have been divested by statute be permitted to
retain those rights by private agreement?
In two cases in which this question has arisen, courts have
adopted different approaches. In Ex rel. R.C.,' a dispute arose
between a known donor and an unmarried woman concerning
their pre-conception understanding as to the donor's role following
the child's birth. The Supreme Court of Colorado held that the
agreement between the parties that the donor would be treated as
the father of the child meant that the rights of the donor should
be preserved, despite Colorado's adoption of section 5(b) of the
UPA.' The court concluded that the donor should be treated as
the legal father because the Colorado legislature "neither considered nor intended to affect the rights of known donors who gave
their semen to unmarried women for use in artificial insemination
with the agreement that the donor would be the father of any
child so conceived."'67 However, in McIntyre v. Crouch," in
which a known donor maintained-and the unmarried woman who
was inseminated with his sperm denied-that he gave his sperm
relying on an agreement that he would remain active in the child's
life, the Oregon Court of Appeals held that the state statute severing the donor's legal connection to the child barred the donor
"from rights and responsibilities of fatherhood, even if [the unmarried woman] had agreed with him before he gave her his semen
that he would have these rights and responsibilities and he gave
his semen in reliance on that agreement."69 The court then went
on to hold that the statute would violate the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, provided that the donor could
establish that he had donated his sperm in reliance on an agreement with the woman that he would have the rights and responsibilities of fatherhood.7"

65. 775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989) (en bane).
66. Id. at 33.
67. Id. at 35.
68.

780 P.2d 239 (Or. Ct. App. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 905 (1990).

69. Id. at 243.
70. Id. at 244. Since there was a dispute as to the material facts respecting the existence and nature of the agreement between two parties, the court of appeals held that
the circuit court had erred in granting summary judgment to the donor. Id. at 245-46.
The case was remanded for a hearing to establish facts that would resolve the dispute.
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3. The Impact of Physician Involvement on ParentalRights. In

some states, it is currently illegal for AID to be performed by
anyone other than a licensed physician.71 While this approach is
adopted only in a minority of jurisdictions, many state statutes do
require that AID be performed "under the supervision of a licensed physician ' in order for the woman's husband to be recognized as the legal father and that the donor's semen be "provided to a licensed physician"' before the donor's legal relationship
with the child can be severed.
While the absence of a physician causes legal complications in
AID situations involving married as well as unmarried women,74
the physician requirement poses special difficulties for unmarried
women. Many physicians refuse to perform AID when the woman
is unmarried,75 for a variety of reasons.76 Although none of the
existing statutes expressly prohibits AID for unmarried women,'
the confusion surrounding the legal consequences of AID in this
context has operated as a significant deterrent for a large number
of physicians.'
The reluctance of physicians to perform AID for unmarried
women, coupled with the fact that AID is a very simple proce71. See supra note 44.
72. UNF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(a), 9B U.L.A. at 301 (1987).
73. Id. § 5(b).
74. See McIntyre, 780 P.2d at 243. Arguably, the child would be illegitimate if a
married couple conceived by AID without the supervision of a physician, where the
statutory provision conferring legitimacy explicitly required physician involvement. See
supra note 44.
75. According to a study conducted in 1979, only about 10% of physicians performing Ai were willing to do so for unmarried women. Martin Curie-Cohen et al., Current
Practice of Artificial Insemination by Donor in the United States, 300 NEw ENG. J. MED.
585, 585 (1979). See also ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION REPORT, supra note 29, at 29. In
the 1987 OTA survey, 61% of physicians indicated that they would reject, for AID, an
unmarried applicant who did not have a partner. When a woman was not only unmarried
and without a male partner, but also lesbian, the rate of rejection by physicians increased
to 63%. Id.
76. These reasons include a belief that children should not be born outside the traditional family unit, a fear that the child will not receive adequate support, and moral or
religious objections to AID (which apply whether the woman is married or unmarried).
Kritchevsky, supra note 4, at 17.
77. However, the statutes in Connecticut, Kansas, and Oklahoma that limit AID to
husbands and wives arguably prohibit the practice for unmarried women. Donovan, supra
note 49, at 218-19. Cf. Kritchevsky, supra note 4, at 19 (arguing that statutes that do not
mention unmarried women do not prohibit them from practicing AID).
78. Kritchevsky, supra note 4, at 17-18.
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dure7 9 has led many unmarried women to inseminate themselves
using semen obtained either from a sperm bank or from a friend
or acquaintance. However, because such semen has not been "provided to a licensed physician" before insemination, the protection
offered by the UPA-based statutes in severing the donor's legal
rights and responsibilities is not available. Consequently, as a result of the parties bypassing the services of a physician, the donor
may be declared the legal father over the objections of the unmarried woman. Thus, women who are deprived of access to AID by
physicians and resort consequently to other channels to obtain
sperm, thereby place themselves and the donors in a potentially
precarious legal situation in the event of a dispute concerning legal
parentage.
An example of some of the problems arising in this area is
seen in the California case of Jhordan C. v. Mary K.'° An unmarried woman, Mary, decided to conceive by means of AID, with
the intention of raising the resulting child jointly with a close
female friend. After interviewing several potential sperm donors,
Mary selected Jhordan. At trial, Mary testified that she had not
wanted Jhordan to have ongoing involvement in the child's life,
whereas Jhordan asserted an agreement to the contrary." The
trial court's decision to declare Jhordan the legal father of the
child was affirmed by the California Court of Appeal.' The appellate court's decision was based neither on the strength of the
evidence as to the parties' respective intentions nor on "any judicial preference toward traditional notions of family structure."' It
was arrived at purely on the ground that the semen used for the
insemination had not been obtained from a licensed physician, as
required by the California Code."
The court in the Jhordan case acknowledged that "nothing
inherent in artificial insemination requires the involvement of a
physician."' However, the court suggested that there were at

79. Wikler & Wikler, supra note 1, at 8.
80. 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986).
81. Id. at 532
82. Id.
83. Id. at 537.
84. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005(b) (West 1983) states, "The donor of semen provided to
a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor's
wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived."
85. Jhordan C., 224 Cal. Rptr. at 535.
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least two justifications that may have motivated the legislature's
decision to include the physician requirement: medical screening
and the desire to provide a witness who can verify and document
that AID has taken place.s While the physician's role in obtaining a medical history of the donor and in conducting medical and

genetic screening is an important one, it does not justify denying
legal protection to those who have chosen not to avail themselves
of physicians' services. There is no reason why sperm banks cannot
fulfill this task just as efficiently as physicians. Indeed, a 1987
survey conducted by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
indicates that the screening practices of commercial sperm banks
appear to be more thorough and comprehensive than those of
many physiciansY From a health standpoint, therefore, women

86. Id. at 534-35. An additional advantage, not mentioned by the court, that was
historically afforded by the role of a doctor in AID cases was the cloak of "medical
therapy" that gave respectability to a practice that was otherwise perceived as morally
ambiguous. A distinct moral queasiness is exhibited in the preoccupation of the early
caselaw with the questions of whether artificial insemination of a married woman with
donor sperm constitutes adultery. See Doornbos v. Doornbos, No. 54 S. 14981 (Superior
Court, Cook County, Dec. 13, 1954), cited in, Michael J. Yaworsky, Annotation, Rights
and Obligations Resulting from Human Artificial Insemination, 83 A.L.R. 4th, 295 310-11
(1991). Cf. People v. Sorensen, 437 P.2d 495, 501 (Cal. 1968) (noting in dicta that artificial insemination of a married woman with donor sperm does not constitute adultery).
The clinical setting of physician-performed AID provided an aura of professional legitimacy that helped to dispel, to some extent, any lingering moral uncertainty associated with
the notion of a woman being impregnated with the semen of a man to whom she is not
married. As has been noted, "[w]ith artificial insemination by donor, medical control converts sin into therapy." Wikler & Wikler, supra note 1, at 11. Today, however, questions
of adultery and legitimacy have largely been laid to rest, and the notion of AID as "sin"
is not a common one.
87. The OTA survey found that all sperm banks surveyed screened for HIV antibodies, and most screened for a range of sexually transmitted diseases and for specific genetic disorders. ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION REPORT, supra note 29, at 68-70. The sperm
banks generally adopted professional guidelines and procedures as part of their protocols-for example, guidelines set forth by the American Association of Tissue Banks or
the American Fertility Society. Id. at 71. Among the 367 physicians surveyed by the
OTA, only 56% required diagnostic tests other than fertility screening, 44% tested for
the HIV virus, an average of 25% tested for syphilis, gonorrhea, hepatitis, or chlamydia,
and 48% tested for some genetic disorders. Id. at 34-35.
The lax screening practices of physicians were documented in an earlier study published in 1979, surveying 379 physicians who performed AID. This survey revealed that
family histories taken by physicians were usually limited to superficial questions or a simple checklist of common diseases, that laboratory testing was minimal, and that "[m]ost
screening was performed by physicians who were not trained for this task." Curie-Cohen
et al., supra note 75, at 588.
Currently, only three states-California, Florida, and Indiana-legislatively mandate
the screening of semen donors beyond testing to determine HIV status. CAL. HEALTH &
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undergoing AID may be taking less of a medical risk if they obtain the semen through a sperm bank rather than through a physician who has obtained the semen from a source other than a
sperm bank.' Yet the AID legislation in a great many states effectively penalizes parties who choose not to use the services of a
physician by affording no legal assurance as to the assignment of
paternal rights and duties in that circumstance.
The second justification for physician involvement suggested
by the court in Jhordan is that "the presence of a professional
third party such as a physician can serve to create a formal, documented structure for the donor-recipient relationship, without
which ...

misunderstandings between the parties regarding the

nature of their relationship and the donor's relationship to the
child would be more likely to occur." 9

There is clearly a need to have some mechanism for documenting and verifying the fact that AID has taken place under
any legal system in which different legal consequences follow conception through AID as opposed to conception through sexual
intercourse. In the absence of a formal mechanism, the only available evidence is the testimony of the parties themselves. This
testimony may be of limited usefulness to the court if the parties
present inconsistent versions of how conception occurred, in an
effort to achieve or avoid particular legal consequences. However,
while an objective means of documenting the fact that the conception took place through AID is important in the event of later disputes, this end can be achieved without requiring the presence of
a physician. As discussed in Part II, there are Alternative means
available for recording the fact that AID is being used and for
documenting the parties' intentions and expectations regarding
parental status.' Moreover, a physician is able to attest that the
AID procedure did take place, but is not necessarily able to testify
as to the intentions of the parties regarding legal parental status.

SAFETY CODE § 1644.5 (West Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ch. 381.6105 (1990); IND. CODE
ANN. § 16-41-14-5 (Bums 1993); see Anita M. Hodgson, The Warranty of Sperm: A
Modest Proposal to Increase the Accountability of Sperm Banks and Physicians in the

Performance of Artificial Insemination Procedures, 26 IND. L. REV. 357 (1993).
88. Approximately half of the physicians surveyed in the OTA report obtained their
donor semen from commercial sperm banks. ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION REPORT, supra
note 29, at 63.

89. Jhordan C., 224 Cal. Rptr. at 535.
90. See infra Section II(E).
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The parties may have arrived at an agreement as to the parental
roles they envisage for themselves and each other that they have

not communicated to the physician.
A third ostensible advantage of physician involvement-not
mentioned by the Jhordan court-might be that physicians can
maintain medical and personal records concerning the participants
in the AID procedure. While record-keeping is important for a
number of reasons that have to do with both the physical and the
psychological well-being of the child born of AID and the donor,91 again there is no reason why this function should be restricted to physicians or why physicians are necessary or particularly well qualified for this task. Indeed, in the vast majority of states
the law does not require the maintenance of records by physicians,' and a large percentage of physicians supervising AID in
fact do not keep records.93 Many physicians are opposed to any
legislative requirement of record-keeping, 9 probably due to a
concern that record-keeping may jeopardize donor anonymity,
which in turn may lead to a reduction in the donor pool. Some
91. For example, a child conceived through AID may have a medical need to access
the medical or genetic history of the biological father. Moreover, if the child is born with
a genetic disorder or transmissible disease, the physician should be able to contact the
donor to inform him of this problem, as well as to ensure that the donor's semen is not
used again. Conversely, if a donor discovers a genetic disease later in his life and wishes
to convey this information to his AID-born child, the absence of records will make it
impossible for him to do so. Further, record-keeping is an important measure in controlling the number of inseminations using any one donor's sperm, thereby minimizing the
risk of consanguineous marriages or sexual relationships between AID-born children.
Finally, the absence of records deprives the child of the opportunity ever to learn the
identity of the child's biological father, a result that could be disturbing to the child. See
infra notes 140-43 and accompanying text. While reasonable minds may differ as to the
wisdom of disclosing the donor's identity to the child, the failure to keep any identifying
information completely forecloses this option.
92. Only two of the non-UPA-based statutes provide for the retaining and filing of
the donor's medical records-Indiana and Ohio. IND. CODE ANN. § 16-41-14-14 (Burns
1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.33, .36 (Baldwin 1992). While the UPA-based
statutes provide that the husband's written consent must be certified by the physician and
filed with the state, see supra notes 32, 34, there is no requirement that physicians maintain any medical records pertaining to the AID procedure.
93. The Curie-Cohen study of AID physician practices indicates that while 92.2% of
physicians surveyed kept records on the inseminated women, only 30A% kept records on
donors and only 36.9% kept permanent records on the children born through AID. Curie-Cohen et al., supra note 75, at 588. According to the OTA report, 32% of physicians
surveyed did not keep records. ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION REPORT, supra note 29, at 46.

94. The Curie-Cohen study found that 82.6% of physicians opposed any legislative
requirement that records on children or donors be maintained. Curie-Cohen et al., supra
note 75, at 588.
95. Specifically, the fear is that many potential donors may be deterred by the per-
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physicians even deliberately use different donors within the same
menstrual cycle to ensure confusion regarding the donor's identity
and thus make record-keeping impossible.' Therefore, in light of
current physician practice, the requirement of physician involvement can hardly be said to be compelled by the record-keeping
function. Moreover, there are others who could equally well perform the task of record-keeping. When a woman obtains sperm
from a sperm bank with no physician involvement, the sperm bank
could be required to keep records. If a woman selects a known
donor and chooses to have no physician involvement, the state
could have the responsibility of maintaining confidential records
containing identifying information regarding the AID participantsY
Thus, making legal parental status contingent on physician
involvement is difficult to justify by reference to health concerns,
evidentiary considerations, or record-keeping functions. Moreover,
the requirement of physician involvement has had a detrimental
impact on the autonomy of unmarried women in procreative decisionmaking as to AID. Physicians have assumed a "social gatekeeping" role with respect to AID, making subjective determinations of "fitness for parenthood" under the guise of performing a,
"medical" procedure. The social control exercised by physicians in
accepting or rejecting AID "patients" is considerable. Physicians
apply a wide range of nonmedical standards in determining the
suitability of individual women and couples,98 sometimes applying
criteria that are subjective and idiosyncratic." In the area of do-

ceived threat of a successful legal action against them with consequent financial obligations owed to the child. See infra notes 156-58 and accompanying text. The dread of
being saddled with legal obligations appears to loom large in the minds of donors, even
though the experience of those physicians who do keep permanent records on donors
indicates that in reality the threat is extremely remote. George J. Annas, Fathers Anonymous: Beyond the Best Interests of the Sperm Donor, 14 FAM. L.Q. 1, 12 (1980-1981).
96. According to the Curie-Cohen study, 31.8% of physicians surveyed engaged in
this practice. Curie-Cohen et al., supra note 75, at 587.
97. See infra Section II(E).
98. These criteria include marital status, sexual orientation, age, psychological maturity, financial circumstances, intelligence, educational level, evidence of child abuse, and
criminal record. ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION REPORT, supra note 29, at 27, 29. While commercial sperm banks also employ nonmedical criteria for screening recipients, they are far
less likely to reject women on the basis of intelligence. Id. at 65.
99. Such criteria include, for example, the applicant's honesty, her commitment to
keeping the secret of AID from friends and relatives, a reasonable life expectancy, and
whether AID is consistent with the applicant's religious faith. See Wikler & Wikler, supra
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nor selection, too, physicians exercise much social control, frequently applying individualized, social standards in accepting or
rejecting donors.1"
Yet there is little evidence to suggest that physicians have any
special training or expertise in this area. Social judgments made by
physicians as to eligibility for parenthood for both donors and
recipients seriously infringe on the procreative autonomy of women and couples undergoing AID. The legal system has contributed
to this problem by creating legal incentives for people to use the
services of physicians without ensuring that there is a corresponding medical advantage, and by allowing physicians to become and
remain the self-appointed arbiters of determining parental suitability. Unmarried women desiring AID have been doubly disadvan-

taged by the physician requirement: first by encountering problems
of access to the medical profession,"' and then by being denied
protection by the legal system when nonmedical alternatives are
sought."°
II. A PROPOSED INTENT-BASED LEGAL SYSTEM FOR AID

Under current AID law, pre-conception intentions are accorded
significance only in limited circumstances. When the woman undergoing AID is married, her husband's consent to the AID proce-

note 1, at 14-15.
100. Standards used to reject donors include, for example, psychological immaturity, a
criminal record, educational achievement below high school level, less than average intelligence, and evidence of child abuse. ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION REPORT, supra note 29, at
39. These criteria also are employed by commercial sperm banks. Id. at 68.
Physicians tend to choose an overwhelming percentage of medical students and hospital residents as donors. Curie-Cohen et al., supra note 75, at 586. While this is no
doubt due partly to reasons of convenience and practicality, physicians may also be engaging to some extent in eugenic decisionmaking. See FINEGOLD, supra note 29, at 37
("Since we perform insemination using young physicians and upper classmen of the medical school, we assume that our recipients are being fertilized by the spermatozoa of men
who are one little step above the average."). As one commentator has observed,
In general [physicians] lave chosen to reproduce themselves (or those in their
profession), and this is what sociobiologists would probably have predicted.
While this should not be surprising, it should be a cause for concern. Physicians
may believe that society needs more individuals with the attributes of physicians, but it is unlikely that society as a whole does.
George J. Annas, Artificial Insemination: Beyond the Best Interests of the Donor, 9
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 14, 14 (1979).
101. See supra note 75.
102. E.g., Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986).
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dure is required before parental status can be assigned to him.0 3
Therefore, the husband's legal rights and responsibilities with respect to the child born of AID are dependent not only on the
existence of a marital relationship between himself and the inseminated woman (as with the common law marital presumption), but
also on the existence of his pre-conception intent to assume those
rights and responsibilities."°
By contrast, when an unmarried woman and a known donor
conceive through AID and do not use a physician to facilitate the
conception, pre-conception intent is generally not regarded as any
more relevant than when two unwed people conceive through
sexual intercourse."5 This raises the question of whether-when
unmarried parties are involved in an AID arrangement-current
family law principles should apply, or whether there are reasons
that justify departing from that model and applying instead a system of legal rules that takes seriously the parties' pre-conception
intent.
A. The Centrality of Pre-Conception Intent in AID
An important argument in favor of a system based on preconception intentions in AID is that the defining feature of this
reproductive technique, when contrasted with coital procreation, is
intentionality. Prior to the advent of the new reproductive practices, intentionality played a very limited role in procreation. Historically, while individuals could assert some degree of control in at-

103.

See supra subsection I(B)(1).

104. As noted in the legislative debates on the Illinois Parentage Act, the Act "leaves
totally ambiguous a situation of what happens when a married woman is artificially inseminated without the consent of [her] husband." In re Marriage of Adams, 528 N.E.2d
1075, 1089 (II!. App. Ct. 1988) (Dunn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 83d Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, Nov. 2, 1983, at 82 (statement of Rep.
Brummer)). A question could arise as to whether the common law presumption of legitimacy would operate in an AID case in which the husband had not consented to the
AID procedure. While this point has not been addressed directly by the courts, it seems
reasonable to infer from existing caselaw that the consent requirement in AID legislation
cannot be discarded and replaced by the presumption of legitimacy so as to hold a husband who has not consented to his wife's AID liable for support. See, e.g., Anonymous

v. Anonymous, 1991 WL 57753 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1991), in which a husband whose
wife was artificially inseminated without his consent successfully sought a judicial declaration of nonpaternity. While the court held that he was liable for support payments, this
holding was based on a promise he made to his wife after she was already pregnant. Id.
at *17.
105. See supra subsection I(B)(2).
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tempting-often through "magical" means-to enhance or diminish
the chances for conception, by and large "biological procreation
was more a matter of fate than of intention."1" Although today
much more control is afforded over coital procreation through the
use of contraceptives or tests for ovulation, intentions are still
often shaped ex post facto as a response to a biological reality,
namely, an existing fetus or child. AID, on the other hand, provides considerable opportunity before conception for individuals
and couples to exercise a high degree of choice and control over
the procreative process and to negotiate the roles they wish to
assume in that process. Unlike coital procreation, in which the creation of offspring may or may not be the desired aim of sexual
intercourse, AID has the sole aim of reproduction. 7 This distinction-namely, the centrality of intentionality in AID--demands
that the parties' intentions be taken far more seriously than they
are in the present, largely biologically based legal model.
B.

Respecting the Diverse Intentions of the Woman and the Sperm
Donor

To grant legal parental status to a sperm donor who entered
the AID arrangement with no intention of maintaining a committed, ongoing involvement with the child exaggerates the importance of biology to the exclusion of other factors. While biological
connection is important, it does not define parenthood. For many,
the essence of parenting lies less with biological origins than with
the social and emotional relationship associated with the nurturing
of a child. A model that makes parenthood entirely contingent on
biological connection fails to acknowledge that a biological tie
does not necessarily guarantee a social parent-child relationship."~ A biological connection is not a necessary condition for
the development of an ongoing interpersonal relationship between
parent and child, nor is it in and of itself a sufficient condition.
Moreover, a biological relationship devoid of any commitment to
nurturing is inimical to the welfare of the child. More important
than biology alone is a commitment to the ongoing care of the
child, a commitment that may or may not be grounded in biology.

106.
107.

Schultz, supra note 16, at 304.
Id. at 308-10.

108.

PAUL LAURrZEN, PURSUING PARENTHOOD 82 (1993).
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In the words of one writer, "Parental responsibilities are, in a
sense, inalienable, but it is not genetic connection that makes them
so; rather, it is the intense, person-specific nature of the interpersonal bonds that constitute the parental relation that makes parental responsibility largely nontransferable."'"
Furthermore, a system that grants the sperm donor legal parental status merely on the basis of his biological connection to
the child ignores a vital distinction between his role and that of
the inseminated woman. While both the inseminated woman and
the sperm donor have contributed biologically to the creation of
the child, the inseminated woman has contributed in an additional
way. She has conceived the child not only biologically, but also
psychologically."' Without her intention, desire, and efforts in
bringing the child into existence, the reproductive process would
1 It is the woman, not the sperm donor,
not have been initiated."
who has entered into the AID arrangement with a commitment to
the major life task of raising the child. As one writer states,
When the child's existence begins in the minds of the desiring
parents, biological conception of the child declines in importance
relative to psychological conception with respect to the full life of
the child. The mental concept of the child is a controlling factor
of its creation, and1 the originators of that concept merit full
credit as conceivers. 1
In contrast, the genetic father in AID typically sees his
role-initially at least-as purely instrumental. Far from being able
to claim "full credit as [the mental] conceiver," the sperm donor
often makes a decision at the time of insemination that he does
not wish to maintain an intense, ongoing social relationship with
the child.
These diverse intentions held by the parties upon entering the
AID arrangement should be protected by the law. It is most likely
that if a woman knew that after conception a potential sperm
donor would envisage his role differently from that agreed on, she
would not select him as a sperm donor. Similarly, a sperm donor

109. Id. at 83.
110. This process has been termed "mental conception" by one writer. Stumpf, supra
note 12, at 195-96.
111. John L. Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a "Parent"? The Claims of Biology as
the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 415 (1991).
112. Stumpf, supra note 12, at 195-96.
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would probably not enter into an arrangement if he knew that due
to a post-conception change of mind by the inseminated woman,
he would be expected to meet certain obligations with respect to
the child. Each party relies on representations made by the other,
and without those representations the AID process would not
proceed.
However, it might be maintained that as far as the sperm
donor's promises are concerned, enforcement of his pre-conception
intentions is undesirable because it is unknown what emotional
changes he may experience either during the woman's pregnancy
or at some point after the birth. He may develop an emotional
attachment to the child (or prospective child), and consequently
may experience profound regret if his rights to the child are alienated. Arguably, the law should protect the sperm donor too from
the consequences of his own contractual undertaking, either by
holding the contract unenforceable, or by mandating a waiting
period after the birth of the child during which the sperm donor
may change his mind."' It might further be claimed that in a society that upholds the value of males developing committed relationships with their offspring, it is inconsistent and counterproductive to enforce the donor's original intentions when he has
changed his mind and now wishes to take upon himself the responsibilities of fatherhood.
The problem with this line of reasoning is that it undermines
the interest of the woman undergoing AID in being able to plan
her familial future with any degree of predictability. Allowing the
sperm donor to escape his contractual undertaking violates the
woman's autonomy and the choices she has made. There is no
obvious reason why the sperm donor's feelings of regret following
his change of heart should be accorded greater weight than the
feelings of betrayal that the woman is likely to experience in this

113. An analogy may be drawn here with adoption statutes, which in many states do
not allow a parent to relinquish parental rights or to surrender a child for adoption until
after a specified period following the birth of the child. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §
20-7-2323 (Law. Co-op 1993). However, this analogy is unsatisfactory because of the
asymmetry involved in the comparison between donating gametes, on the one hand, and
conceiving, carrying, and giving birth to a child, on the other. The question of whether
women who intend to conceive and bear a child for another should be able to relinquish

contractually their parental rights prior to the birth of the child has been the subject of
extensive debate in the literature relating to surrogacy contracts, e.g., N.J. COMM'N RE-

PORT, supra note 13, at 141-44, but is outside the scope of this Article.
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situation. Rather than allowing the woman's autonomy to be compromised, the law should attempt, as far as possible, to minimize
the risk of regret on the part of the sperm donor by establishing
important safeguards, such as mandatory waiting periods prior to
insemination n 4 and mandatory counseling sessions,115 designed
to ensure that the donor's decision is reached in as thoughtful and
fully informed a manner as possible.
A social policy that ignores relied-on representations and expectations consistent with those representations is damaging to the
interests of both the inseminated woman and the sperm donor,
since it pays inadequate attention to the importance of safeguarding people's desires to shape their own personal and familial destinies.16 In an area as intimate as procreation, it may well be destructive for negotiated expectations to be overridden by a change
of intention by one party. As one writer has expressed it, "To
ignore the significance of deliberation, purpose and expectation-the capacity to envision and shape the future through intentional choice-is to17disregard one of the most distinctive traits that
makes us human."'
C. AID as a Special Case
If pre-conception intention forms the basis for the proposed
legal system governing AID, it might be claimed that identical
legal rules ought to govern procreation achieved through sexual
intercourse, as long as the parties have agreed on the allocation of
parental rights and responsibilities before conception and have
clearly documented their agreement. The basis for this claim would
be that it is the parties' intentions that are important, not the
method by which conception takes place.
As described earlier, the law does not presently allow parties
who have procreated through sexual intercourse to negotiate privately their respective legal rights and obligations.1 Yet, if an
intent-based system is accepted for AID, some might argue that it
is difficult to see why the same system should not govern sexual
intercourse, where the only distinction resides in the instrumentali-

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

See infra note 144.
See infra note 145.
See Schultz, supra note 16, at 377-78.
Id. at 377.
See supra Section I(A).
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ty used to achieve conception. For the state to deny the benefits
of the proposed intent-based system on the basis of what many
would view as a technicality seems somewhat arbitrary, as well as
unduly intrusive. Moreover, since no proof would be available to
determine whether the parties in fact conceived by AID rather
than sexual intercourse, such a standard would be inherently unenforceable-and for that reason, too, undesirable.
There are, however, two reasons that might justify treating
AID as a special case and applying different legal rules for procreation by AID than for procreation by sexual intercourse. The first
reason concerns the central role that intentionality plays in AID.
As discussed above, while pregnancy may or may not be an intended consequence of sexual intercourse, it is the sole goal of
AID." 9 Although there may indeed be some cases in which parties agree to engage in sexual intercourse specifically and only for
the purpose of procreation, in the more usual case there are a
number of possible reasons why sexual intercourse takes place.
Because of the inherent uncertainty involved in attempting to ascertain parties' motives in sexual intercourse, the law is prepared
to impose substantial obligations on males, which cannot be contracted away through private agreement.
Second, whereas in AID the parties contract at arm's length
for a commodity (sperm), in sexual intercourse the parties are not
necessarily negotiating on equal terms, and objectivity is far more
difficult to attain. The psychological and emotional dynamics that
may be involved in a sexual relationship are such that a registration system that encompasses conception by this means might open
the door to potentially coercive situations, which could be extremely disadvantageous to women. For example, a male might
stipulate as a condition of having sexual intercourse with a woman
that the two of them first register their "agreement" that the male
shall have no parental rights or responsibilities. Thus, if an unintended pregnancy should occur, the child would be the woman's
responsibility alone.12 While it may be maintained that in such a
119. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
120. An alternative scenario could occur in which an unmarried couple has sexual
intercourse resulting in an unintended pregnancy, and the male subsequently exerts pressure on the woman to register an "agreement," to avoid his support obligations. However, the establishment of a mandatory waiting period, as proposed in Part III-consisting
of several weeks between the time of registration and attempted conception-would resolve this potential problem in a large number of cases. See infra note 144. Moreover,
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case the woman has "consented" to this possibility and that her
"choice" must therefore be respected, the potential that exists in
sexual intercourse for an imbalance of power raises troubling questions about the voluntary nature of her consent.'
Since onp of the purposes of the proposed intent-based system
is to allow women-especially unmarried women-to control their
own reproductive futures by giving effect to their pre-conception
intentions, it would seem inconsistent to establish a registration
system that could readily be used in an oppressive manner against
women. Moreover, such a system might have the unintended effect
of sending an unfortunate message to society regarding male
procreational responsibility. Instead of encouraging males to take
responsibility for their sexual acts, such a system effectively could
release males entirely from any procreational responsibility in connection with sexual intercourse. In sanctioning a means for men to
engage in sexual intercourse without legal consequences, this approach would be deeply destructive to the progress that has been
made in conveying the notion that sexual intercourse carries with
it certain responsibilities that cannot be disclaimed at will.
D. The Interests of the Child
As discussed earlier, a basic assumption evident in current
family law principles is that an arrangement that conforms with
the nuclear family model is in the child's best interests. While
there may be much merit in this proposition as a general ideal, it
is not necessarily true in the context of AID. It cannot be assumed that a child's needs are always best served by having two
biological, legal parents in circumstances in which those parents
never originally intended to create a family unit. When the woman's wishes upon entering the AID arrangement were that the
sperm donor not have any ongoing involvement in the child's life,
or when the sperm donor contributed his sperm with the understanding that he would not be required to contribute financially to
evidence of fraud would vitiate the agreement.
121.

See RUTH COLKER, ABORTION AND DIALOGUE: PRO-CHOICE, PRO-LIFE, AND

AMERICAN LAW 43-57 (1992) (discussing some of the implications of the coercion and
relative powerlessness experienced by many women in sexual relations with men); see
also Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race and Equal Protection, 61
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003, 1059 (1986) (proposing the development of laws and policies aimed
at eliminating the historical patterns of power inequality between the sexes).
122. See supra notes 12-20, 49-63 and accompanying text.
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help raise the child, the resentment and hostility likely to be experienced by the party whose intentions have been overridden and
the probable resulting tensions will hardly be conducive to the
child's healthy development. In general, "[h]onoring the plans and
expectations of adults who will be responsible for a child's welfare
is likely to correlate significantly with positive outcomes for parents and children alike."1" Although the child may gain some
financial advantage if the sperm donor is recognized as the legal
father, it is not at all clear that this economic benefit necessarily
promotes the best interests of the child. To assert otherwise is to
assume both that the amorphous concept of the "best interests of
the child" is capable of clear definition,124 and that economic
benefit must be accorded priority in the hierarchy of values present in the "best interests" concept. While financial benefit may be
one of many relevant considerations, it should not be seen as
determinative. When bitterness is experienced either by the sperm
donor or by the mother as a result of being forced into a family
structure that was neither desired nor intended, any financial benefit to the child that results from this arrangement may not necessarily outweigh or compensate for the potential harm suffered by
the child.
But how should an AID parental rights conflict be resolved if
the original agreement was that the sperm donor would not contribute financially but it can be shown some years after the birth
that the child is in fact suffering economically? Or if the original
agreement was that the sperm donor would not have ongoing contact with the child but it is evident at some subsequent point that
the child is suffering emotionally or psychologically due to the
absence of the biological father, and the sperm donor is available
and willing to be involved in the child's life, contrary to the
mother's wishes? Should the child's interests be sacrificed in order
to uphold the original agreement? One view is that the child's best
interests should be the sole guiding principle and the paramount
concern. However, to vary the original agreement by according the
sperm donor legal parental status over the objections of one of the
parties is to ignore relied-on expectations and to remove any element of predictability or certainty from the AID arrangement.

123. Schultz, supra note 16, at 397.
124. "Deciding what is best for a child poses a question no less ultimate than the
purposes and values of life itself." Mnookin, supra note 26, at 260.
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A possible solution that attempts to take account of the
child's interests while still giving weight to intentionality would be
to accord a very high presumptive value to the agreement between
the sperm donor and the woman, and to allow judicial modification of that agreement over the objections of one of the parties
only in exceptional circumstances. For example, when there is
strong evidence that the child is suffering emotionally or psychologically, and the sperm donor is available and willing to have
some limited contact with the child, the court might revisit the
original agreement and decide to grant the child's petition for such
contact over the objections of the child's mother. In such circumstances, the donor could be awarded limited visitation rights, but
would still not be viewed as the legal father."2 It would be important that his rights be carefully and narrowly circumscribed, to
avoid undermining the centrality of intentionality."6 Particular
caution would need to be exercised by courts when the claim is
that the child's suffering is financial and that the donor should
therefore be obligated to pay support despite a pre-conception
agreement to the contrary. Allowing modification of the agreement
on this basis could open the door to potential abuses; a woman
might fraudulently induce a donor to enter into an AID arrangement by representing that no financial obligations would be incurred on his part, while intending to sue him after conception for
support by invoking the "best interests of the child." Requiring an
extremely high standard of evidence in order to overturn the presumed validity of the original agreement would represent an attempt to achieve predictability and certainty of legal outcome,
while at the same time providing some flexibility when the court is
persuaded that the welfare of the child dictates a modification of
the original agreement.
E. Evidence of Intentions: The Role of the State
In a system in which intentionality would be the primary determinant of legal parental status in AID cases, it would be very
important to establish a formal legal structure within which the
parties' intentions could be verified and recorded. Given the in-

125. See supra note 9.
126. For example, while he may be granted limited visitation rights, he would not
enjoy custodial rights or have support obligations, and the child would not have inheri-

tance rights through him.
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tensely private and personal nature of conception, witnesses are, of
course, rarely present at the event; thus, the only evidence of the
circumstances surrounding conception and the respective intentions
of the parties is the testimony of the immediate participants. The
absence of any formal, objective mechanism for ascertaining the
nature of the original agreement would make it extremely difficult
for a decisionmaker to ascertain what the parties' intentions were,
in attempting to resolve post-conception disputes and misunderstandings.
As described earlier, there are a number of reasons why mandating physician involvement in the performance or supervision of
the AID procedure is undesirable.127 The goal of ascertaining and
formalizing the parties' pre-conception intentions and expectations
in AID can, however, be achieved without requiring physician involvement. A registration system, whereby parties intending to
conceive through AID would be required to register with the State
Department of Health, if they wish to enjoy the benefit of a predictable legal outcome, represents one possible solution."2
A registration system would offer a number of advantages.
First, it would force the parties to clarify their respective intentions
and to communicate those intentions to one another prior to the
insemination. By placing all parties on notice as to the expectations held, the potential for misunderstandings would be reduced
substantially. Second, in the event that a dispute does arise subsequent to the conception, the documents that have been filed would

127. See supra subsection I(B)(3).
128. Lor B. Andrews, Legal and Ethical Aspects of New Reproductive Technologies,
29 CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 190, 199 (1986) (advocating a voluntary registry system). In the case of a known donor, the form would be executed by the woman
undergoing AID, her husband (if any), and the donor, and filed with the state. The form
would specify clearly that the donor has no legal parental rights or responsibilities, in the
absence of an agreement to the contrary between the parties. Any such contrary agreement would be attached to the form, and both documents would be filed with the state.
If the woman is married and her husband agrees to be the legal father of the child
resulting from AID, he would need to sign and file a form acknowledging his legal paternity. When the known donor acknowledges that he has no legal status vis.d-vis the
child but nevertheless expresses his desire prior to conception to maintain some ongoing
contact with the child, and when no objection is raised by the woman (or her husband,
if any), a "consent to visitation" form should also be signed and filed by the parties.
While legal problems regarding parental status are far less likely to occur in the
case of an anonymous donor than with a known donor, the anonymous donor too should
be informed in writing of his legal position, and a signed acknowledgment should be filed
with the state.
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provide invaluable evidence regarding the parties' pre-conception
intentions. Third, a registration system could provide the parties
with essential information regarding the legal consequences of their
acts. Under the present legal system it is likely that many AID
participants-especially in arrangements with known donors-have
little knowledge concerning their legal positions in the event that
one of the parties changes his or her mind post-conception. Finally, for those who choose to register with the state, it would offer
an assurance of a legal outcome consistent with their original
intentions. For those who use AID without registering with the
state, disputes would be resolved by application of current family
law principles as they apply to coital procreation.
A registration system would, of course, require a considerable
degree of involvement by the state in AID. In addition to having
concerns regarding confidentiality, 9 some may argue that it is
undesirable for the state to have more than a minimal role in the
AID process, given the private, personal nature of the activity in
question. According to this view, parties should order their arrangements through private contracts, with the state's role being
primarily to facilitate the arrangements by recognizing and enforcing agreements that have been entered into freely. However, while
excessive involvement by the state in the reproductive lives of
those wishing to procreate through AID is undesirable, a permissive regulatory scheme arguably would have some advantages over
a private ordering system.
Through an inducement model 3 '
129. The numerous documents evidencing the AID arrangement, for example, may be
seen as potentially jeopardizing confidentiality. This concern is a serious one, as lack of
confidence in confidentiality could deter many from using a registration system. However,
this problem could be overcome through a legislative requirement that all documents
filed be kept confidential and sealed, to be inspected only upon court order.
130. A permissive system is preferable to a restrictive regulatory scheme, because the
latter would carry with it the danger of intrusive involvement and control by the state.
The state might decide, for example, to impose criteria of eligibility for AID that exclude
certain groups who have been traditionally disadvantaged and marginalized in procreative
matters, such as unmarried women. While this is indeed a matter for concern, it is unclear that any such attempted regulation by the state would withstand constitutional challenge. Arguably, an unmarried woman's right to procreate is a fundamental right protected by the Federal Constitution and, therefore, those provisions in the UPA-based statutes
that create obstacles may be unconstitutional if they cannot be justified by a compelling
state interest. UNIF. PARENTAGE AcT §§ 5, 9B U.L.A. at 301-02, 303 (1987); see Donovan, supra note 49, at 230. The right to procreate and the right to privacy, protected by
-the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, provide the basis for this
claim. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). No court has yet ruled on the question of whether access to the new reproductive practices by either married or unmarried
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such as that proposed above, the parties would be assured of a
predictable, intended, and desired legal outcome provided certain
steps are followed. At the same time, flexibility would be built
into the system, as the parties could come to their own arrangement regarding their respective roles vis-d-vis the child, provided
their agreement is registered with the state. The state could thereby maintain a degree of control over the process, enabling it to
play a constructive role in addressing comprehensively the many
important aspects of the practice of AID that require legislative
attention.132
III. BIOLOGY AND PROCREATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN AID
If an intent-based system as proposed above is adopted, does it
follow that the donor's contribution of sperm should be regarded
as "merely" biological and therefore of little, if any, legal consequence in all contexts? Specifically, even if the donor does not acquire legal parental status, might the fact that he has donated
sperm impose on him certain legal obligations concerning the disclosure of his identity at some future point to his biological child?
It might be contended that under a system based on intentionality, the biological contribution of the donor should be considered
to be relatively unimportant. This argument is grounded in the
assumption that intentionality and biology are essentially dichotomous, so that any attempt to give weight to both factors results in

persons is a fundamental constitutional right. For an analysis of the constitutional implications involved in the use of the new reproductive practices by unmarried persons, see
Donovan, supra note 49, at 216-22; Kritchevsky, supra note 4, at 26-40; Denise S. Kaiser, Note, Artificial Insemination: Donor Rights in Situations Involving Unmarried Recipients, 26 J. FAM. L. 793, 802-07 (1987-1988); Patricia A. Kern & Kathleen M. Ridolfi,
Note, The Fourteenth Amendment's Protection of a Woman's Right to Be a Single Parent
Through Artificial Insemination by Donor, 7 WoMEN's RTs. L. REP. 251, 258-70 (1982);
Note, supra note 4, at 677.
131. See supra note 35.
132. These include, for example, the medical screening of sperm donors by physicians
and sperm banks, and the maintenance of records containing information regarding the
personal, medical, and genetic histories of AID participants. In addition, the number of
children conceived using any one donor's sperm could be strictly limited, to avoid potential problems of incest between children born of AID. This would require accurate records on donations to be maintained by physicians and sperm banks on a centralized
computer registry, to prevent the possibility of a donor making multiple donations at
different locations. Stringent measures would need to be' adopted to ensure that only authorized personnel have access to the stored information relating to the identity of those
participating in an AID arrangement.
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irreconcilable tension. In actuality, both intentionality and biology
are significant, but they are significant in different contexts. Emphasizing only intentionality or only biological contribution leads
to a partial, and therefore distorted, perspective. While this Article
proposes that pre-conception intentions should govern the determination of legal parental status, it also maintains that there needs to
be a collective recognition, reflected in our legal system, that donating genetic material is an act with important personal, moral,
and societal implications. Such a recognition might lead to the
imposition of specific legal obligations on the donor, even when
the donor is not accorded legal parental status.
Due perhaps to the rapid medicalization of AID and the
consequent legitimation of the practice, AID became accepted with
relatively little public debate concerning its possible psychological
and emotional impact on both the donor and the child. Moreover,
as sperm banks have become widely established, 33' scant attention
has been paid to the social and moral desirability of encouraging
males to father children anonymously. The interest of the medical
profession in creating and maintaining a large and constant pool of
donors has led to a view of AID-largely unchallenged to this
day-as a health issue, rather than as an issue with potentially
profound personal and societal ramifications.1" Since the principal purpose of sperm banks always has been to help infertile couples, sperm donation generally has been socially encouraged and
even applauded. Many view sperm donation in much the same
light as blood donation, and indeed there are some obvious parallels.135 Both sperm and blood are products of the body, donated

133. Terra Ziporyn, "Artificial" Human Reproduction Poses Medical, Social Concerns,
255 JAMA 13, 13 (1986) (noting that there were "about 25 commercial and universitybased sperm banks in the United States" in 1986).
134. Daniel Callahan, Opening the Debate?: A Response to the Wiklers, 69 MILBANK
Q. 41, 43 (1991).
135. However, sperm "donors" are usually paid for their contributions, unlike most
blood donors. A more accurate appellation would be "sperm vendor." Sperm "donors"
generally receive $25 to $50 per donation. John A. Robertson, Technology and Motherhood: Legal and Ethical Issues in Human Egg Donation, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 29

(1988-1989). While a detailed discussion of the issue of payment for sperm lies beyond
the scope of this Article, a legal system that aims to convey the profound personal and
societal implications of gamete donation ought to consider whether the commercial exchange of gametes is desirable. The fact that gametes have life-creating potential and that
they bear unique genetic characteristics means that it may be inappropriate to trade them
as "commodities" in the market. As one writer has noted, "If certain human parts are
'dignified,' then our social traditions suggest they may be given, but not sold, and owner-
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to people in need. Both are easily accessible, involving no intrusive
or dangerous surgical intervention. Both are substances that are
painlessly and quickly replenished by the human body. However,
these similarities should not obscure one critically important distinction between sperm donation and blood donation: while blood
is life-sustaining, sperm is life-creating. Blood supports fife, but
sperm is used to create a new and unique genetic identity, a human being. Given the life-generating quality of sperm donation,
how should society view this activity?
On a societal level, it can be argued, the sanctioning of biological fatherhood with absolutely "no strings attached"-a description that applies to the current practice of artificial insemination
using an anonymous donor's sperm-sends entirely the wrong message regarding male procreational responsibility. While many-including, of course, numerous feminists-have long attempted to
encourage males to appreciate that they bear some responsibility
for the lives of the children they beget, the cavalier manner in
which society has treated sperm donation directly undermines this
message. As Daniel Callahan asks, "[W]hat is AI other than an
organized and sanctioned way of allowing men to be biological
'
fathers and still bear no responsibility for their children?"136
On a personal level, the current practice of anonymous sperm
donation may have a variety of possible negative effects on the
well-being of both the sperm donor and the child. The sperm donor may suffer as a result of the lack of information concerning
any child he may have begotten-or indeed, even as to whether or
not a live birth has resulted. He may also suffer from the knowledge that he will never have the opportunity to meet his biological

ship of them is only of a special, limited kind." Thomas H. Murray, Gifts of the Body

and the Needs of Strangers, 17 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 30, 38 (1987).
Payment beyond direct expenses should be prohibited for both sperm and egg do-

nors, and contracts involving payment should be held void as contravening public policy.
Resolution of parental rights disputes arising from such agreements would thus be governed by traditional family law principles. While this approach would constitute a limitation on the proposed intent-based model, its impact on sperm donation would be relatively slight compared with its effect on egg donation. The considerably greater payments
involved in egg donation (usually $1,500 to $2,000), combined with the fact that, unlike
sperm donation, egg donation constitutes an invasive medical procedure with attendant
risks to the donor, mean that payment to egg donors can create an inducement that is
potentially coercive. For a discussion of the issue of payment to egg donors, see Robertson, supra, at 29-33.
136. Callahan, supra note 134, at 43.
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child. Typically, sperm donors are young men who donate before
they have started their own families.137 At this stage in their
lives, they may have given little serious thought to the emotional
complexities sometimes involved in sperm donation-complexities
that may arise only decades later. Counseling is not offered routinely at sperm banks,"' and consequently many donors may not
have considered fully the implications of their actions. It is not
surprising, therefore, that "[later on when they have children of
their own.., some sperm donors experience remorse about the
artificial insemination children they may have created who are out
there139 in the world, might be in need, and cannot be contacted."'

Long-term anonymity in sperm donation may have especially
serious negative effects on children born of AID. The importance
of preserving the opportunity for children to trace their biological
origins has been well documented in' the adoption context. 4
Recognition of the strong psychological need experienced by many
adoptees to identify their biological parents has led a number of
courts to allow children access to sealed adoption records.' 41 The
"genealogical bewilderment" that can result from being deprived of
a part or all of one's genetic heritage can lead, in some cases, to a
serious identity crisis. 42 While it may be claimed that the psychological burden of adoptees is greater than that of children born of
AID, given that children born of AID at least have access to one
half of their ancestry, denying children born of AID knowledge of
one biological parent nevertheless may undermine their sense of
identity. As noted earlier, in addition to the psychological need to
search for their origins, children born of AID might also have an
137. Ziporyn, supra note 133, at 14 (noting that "[m]ost sperm donors ...have not
started their own families. . . . The average age [of a donor] is 23." (quoting Lori
Andrews, medical law and research attorney, American Bar Foundation)).
138. See Robert D. Nachtigall, Secrecy: An Unresolved Issue in the Practice of Donor
Insemination, 168 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1846, 1851 (19.93)
counseling should be available to sperm donors).

(arguing that

139. Ziporyn, supra note 133, at 14 (quoting Lori Andrews, medical law and research
attorney, American Bar Foundation).
140.

See generally ARTHUR D. SOROSKY ET AL., THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE (1978)

(documenting the negative effects of sealed adoption records).
141. For examples of cases in which the adopted child's interest in knowing the identity of his or her biological parent has received legal recognition, see Lucinda Ann
Smith, Artificial Insemination: Disclosure Issues, 11 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 87, 90

n.25 (1979).
142. See SOROSKY ET AL, supra note 140, at 113.
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important interest in learning their full medical histories, particularly as to hereditary characteristics.143
While a number of safeguards, such as mandatory waiting
periods'" and counseling,145 could be established to minimize
the possible harmful psychological and emotional effects of anonymous donation for both the donor and the child born of AID, the
most important step that needs to be taken involves a critical
reexamination of the current system of long-term anonymity for
donors. To many, anonymity in AID is a sacrosanct principle, and
any inroad into it is highly objectionable. 146 Historically, anonymity has been regarded as essential in ensuring a constant and plentiful supply of sperm. The fear has been that any threat to guaranteed long-term anonymity would deter prospective donors, resulting in depleted resources. However, two questions need to be
asked in this context: first, how much weight should be given to
donors' rights to privacy, as against children's rights to trace their
biological heritage? Second, how realistic is the fear that donors

143. See supra note 91.
144. The main purpose of a mandatory waiting period between registration and insemination would be to give prospective donors the opportunity to reflect on whether sperm
donation is desirable for them, thereby minimizing the possibility of precipitous decisions
by donors. A waiting period might also assist in conveying the message to potential donors that donating sperm is a decision to be considered seriously, not one to be made
hastily. An additional advantage of a waiting period-at least, if it is several weeks in
duration-is that it may protect against fraud, such as when parties attempt to register
post-conception following sexual intercourse.
The purpose of a waiting period as suggested here should be distinguished from
the purpose of a waiting period in the context of abortion. The subject of waiting periods in abortion has been extremely controversial, because in that context waiting periods
impose a substantial obstacle for many women seeking an abortion. See RUTH COLKER,
PREGNANT MEN: PRACrICE, THEORY AND THE LAW 89-127 (1994). However, in the
AID context, the waiting period is directed toward the sperm donors rather than the
women, and its purpose is to provide accurate information to the donor so that he can
make an informed decision, thereby minimizing the risk of potential misunderstandings or
later regrets.
145. Sperm banks and physicians could offer counseling sessions-mandatory for firsttime donors-to each prospective donor, aimed at increasing the donor's awareness of the
emotional consequences that may ensue as a result of the sperm donation, so that he is
able to make a fully informed decision as to whether he wishes to donate. Arguably, it
is only then that the donor could truly give his "informed consent" to the sperm donation. Further, all donors should be informed when a live birth results from the use of
their sperm, so that they have no uncertainty as to whether they did or did not beget a
child or children.
146. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 141, at 97 (arguing that "the identity of the sperm
donor should not be disclosed").
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would be deterred from donating if long-term anonymity were not
guaranteed?
While donors' privacy interest until now has been scrupulously
safeguarded both by physicians and by sperm banks, it is not at all
self-evident that this interest should necessarily outweigh children's
interest in knowing their biological fathers' identities. As noted
earlier, children may have compelling needs relating to "genealogical bewilderment" suffered as a result of being denied access to
one half of their biological heritage.147 Moreover, the donor has a
choice as to whether he wishes to enter the AID arrangement: if
his interest in maintaining his privacy outweighs his desire to be a
donor, he decides accordingly. The child, on the other hand, has
no choice regarding the arrangements made between' the adult
participants, arrangements that may affect the child's life profoundly. Given the child's relative powerlessness, and the potentially damaging consequences that anonymous fatherhood might have
on the child's development, it seems that the law may have been
protecting the donor's interests at the expense of the child's for
too long.148 The current system fails to recognize any responsibility on the part of the anonymous donor and ignores the profound
impact that the donor's act can have on the child. Callahan accurately describes the present system of anonymous donation in the
following terms:
As a symbol of male irresponsibility-and a socially sanctioned
symbol at that-one could hardly ask for anything better than
artificial insemination with the sperm of anonymous donors. It
raises male irresponsibility to the high level of a praised social
institution, and it succeeds in getting males off the hook of fatherhood
and parenthood in a strikingly effective and decisive
149
way.

The adoption experience has shed much light on the importance placed by many children on being able to trace their biological heritage. Just as in many states adopted children are allowed
access to their sealed records when they have reached the age of
majority50 or provided they can show good cause,' children

147.
148.
149.

See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
Annas, supra note 95, at 11-12.
Daniel Callahan, Bioethics and Fatherhood, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 735, 741.
150. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2423 (1993).
151. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 114 (McKinney 1994).
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born of AID too ought to be granted access if the need is similarly compelling. Donors, therefore, should be informed prior to the
time of donation that any child resulting from the AID process
(regardless of whether the mother is married or unmarried at the
time the donation is made) may be entitled at a certain point later
to contact the donor."' The donor would, of course, have no
rights or financial obligations with respect to the child at that
point or at any other time. However, he should understand before
agreeing to donate that his anonymity is guaranteed not absolutely, but only insofar as it does not infringe on the child's compelling need to discover his identity. It should also be made very
clear to the donor before he donates that any such contact may be
initiated only by the child, not by the donor.5 3
Procreation by means of sperm donation ought to entail some
minimal level of responsibility, even though the donor may have
no intention of being the rearing parent. Far greater thought needs
to be given to the effects that anonymous donation may have on
the child, the donor, and the family."5 As one child born of
AID, Suzanne Rubin, has stated poignantly,
I hope that any man who is thinking of being a sperm donor will
stop and consider the possibility that twenty years from now your
child will confront you and want to know what kind of human
being you are, and why you found it so easy to sell the essence
of life to a total stranger."

152. The relevant age of the child could be set, for example, at the age of majority,
as it is in many adoption statutes. Alternatively, a more flexible standard could be employed whereby an individualized assessment is made in each case taking into account
the child's needs and maturity; for example, in Sweden, legislation grants a child born of
AID access to identifying information when the child has reached "enough maturity," as
determined by the hospital and a social worker. See infra note 158.
153. Allowing the donor to initiate contact would be undesirable, as it might prevent
the development of a stable relationship between the legal parent or parents and the
child and thereby threaten the security and integrity of the child's family unit.
154. See generally ANNETTE BARAN & REUBEN PANNOR, LETHAL SECRETS 167-75

(1989) (documenting the destructive impact of secrecy in AID); R. SNOWDEN
ARTIFICIAL REPRODUCrION: A SOCIAL INVESTIGATION 166-82 (1983)

ET AL.,

(describing the

social implications of AID); Ken R. Daniels & Karyn Taylor, Secrecy and Openness in
Donor Insemination, POL. & LIFE Sci., Aug. 1993, at 155.
155. Chris Clayton, The Rights of the Natural Father: AID Donor, in CHANGING FAMILIES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD AUSTRALIAN CONFERENCE ON ADOPTION 65 (R.

Oxenberry ed., 1982).
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The concern that lack of long-term anonymity would discourage sperm donors from donating may be realistic under the present legal system governing parental legal status in the context of
AID, but would be far less likely to be so under the proposed
intent-based system. Given that the current system is largely biologically based rather than intent-based, it is little wonder that the
fear of potential legal complications looms large in the minds of
donors and is likely to operate as a strong disincentive to entering
into an AID arrangement, unless there exists a promise of anonymity. However, this fear would quickly dissipate under an intent-based legal system in which the donor would incur no legal
obligations unless he and the woman have expressly agreed to the
contrary, prior to the insemination. Anonymity for the sake of
protecting the donor from legal obligations would, therefore, be an
unnecessary measure. 6
Of course, even if the threat of legal obstacles were removed,
some donors might be reluctant to donate without long-term anonymity because they might fear that their privacy would be invaded by their AID-born offspring at some future point, causing possible disruption in their personal lives. However, there are data to
suggest that "although concerned and wary, donors are not as
desperate about having absolutely no contact with the child and
about having no information about them relayed to the [recipient]
family as was previously thought."'57 Since not all donors find the

156. It is also important to note that not all donors are influenced by the possibility
of legal complications. Some recent studies indicate that even under the present system in
which the threat of legal complications is significant, there is a subgroup of donors who
would be prepared to donate without the assurance of anonymity. See infra note 157.
157. Robyn Rowland, The Social and Psychological Consequences of Secrecy in Artificial Insemination by Donor (AID) Programmes, 21 Soc. ScI. MED. 391, 394 (1985). In
a survey of donor attitudes in Australia, Rowland found that 82% of donors surveyed
did not object to the giving of nonidentifying information to the couple, 46% indicated
that they would like nonidentifying information to be kept, 46% stated that records including identifying information should be maintained, 42% said they would donate even if
their names were made available to recipients, and 60% of donors stated that they would
not mind if their AID-born offspring, after reaching the age of 18, contacted them in
order to discuss their family background. Id. at 395.
In the United States, a 1981 survey of 39 donors contributing to sperm banks in
the Los Angeles area found that 49% of the donors thought children born of AID
should have the right to discover their biological parents. Linda S. Fidell et al., Paternity
by Proxy, in GENDER IN TRANSITION 93-110 (Joan Offerman-Zuckerberg ed., 1989).
When asked whether they thought donors had any responsibility toward AID children,
21% said "yes." Id. at 101. The most commonly agreed on responsibility was to report
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idea of identifying information being maintained, or even the possibility of being contacted by the child in the future, objectionable,
it is unclear to what degree the size of the donor pool would be
affected.'58 Moreover, it could be argued that even if there were

some cost in the form of a reduction of the number of available
donors, it might be preferable-both from an individual and from

a societal point of view-to accept fewer donors, but donors of a
different type: namely, donors who do not just donate their genetic
materials for financial gain, but who have given serious thought to
the complicated psychological and emotional implications of AID
and who are prepared to take some responsibility for their involvement in the process.
CONCLUSION

A fresh legal blueprint is required if the "new" reproductive
technique of AID is to be suitably assimilated into the legal system. Since family law principles that apply to procreation through
sexual intercourse are not necessarily transferable to AID, state

any potentially inheritable health problems that appeared after donation. Thirty-six percent said they would like to meet their biological children. Only 5% said they thought a
donor should have access to his AID-born child, and 13% said they would be bothered
by meeting an AID-born child who bore a striking resemblance to themselves. Id. at 102.
The authors note that there was "some evidence that donors did not take their donations
lightly" and that it "appears that [donors] felt greater responsibility toward AID children
than the public feels they have." Id.
The willingness of many donors to be contacted by their adult AID-born offspring
is reported also by the Sperm Bank of California in Oakland. Judith Gaynes, A Scandal
of Artificial Inseminaiion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1990 § 6 (Magazine), at 23. This sperm
bank requires each donor to sign a contract either allowing nonidentifying medical records to be made available to recipients, or expressly permitting the donor's name and
address to be released to his biological child, provided the child is 18 years of age and
has requested the information. According to the director of the sperm bank, more than
half of the donors choose to provide identifying information. Id.
158. There is little empirical data available outside the United States regarding the
effects of disclosure of identifying information on donor supply, because most countries
do not allow identifying information to be revealed. However, Sweden has enacted legislation that grants AID-born children who have reached "enough maturity" the right to
learn the identity of their biological fathers, and to contact them. Swedish Law, No.
1140/1984, cited in Daniels & Taylor, supra note 154, at 166. Initially it was feared that
this legislation would deter potential donors. However, according to one commentator,
"[Tihis fear has not been realized. The initial response was exactly as predicted: current
donors stopped donating. But within months the number of donors had risen again to
previous levels, and reports indicate that a different kind of donor is becoming involved
in programs." Rona Achilles, Donor Insemination: The Future of a Public Secret, in THE
FUTURE OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION 105, 115 (Christine Overall ed., 1989).
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legislation to resolve the difficult parental rights conflicts that
inevitably arise in AID needs to be enacted.
An intent-based legal model, in which the pre-conception
intentions of the parties would form the critical determinant in
assigning legal parental status, would be a significant step in the
resolution of conflicts in this area. Under this system, parties
would be able to structure their affairs to achieve the legal consequences they desire, by registering their agreement with the state
prior to carrying out an AID procedure. When a conflict arises because one party has changed his or her mind, the dispute would
then be resolved according to the terms of the original agreement.
Should the court be persuaded that enforcing the pre-conception
agreement would be contrary to the welfare of the child, it would
have the option of reviewing the original agreement and modifying
its terms. While this power should be exercised very sparingly so
that the intent-based system is not undermined, it would provide
some needed flexibility.
The law's response to the new reproductive practices to date
has generally been reactive rather than proactive. Too often the
legal approach in this area has been one of "crisis management,"
in which laws are formulated in response to specific fact situations
that require speedy resolution. This path has failed to acknowledge
that what is required is a paradigmatic shift in legal thinking.
What is needed today is a coherent legal framework that is comprehensive in scope and sensitive to the ethical and societal impact
of this new reproductive era.

